Regenerating codes based on the approach of interference alignment for wireless interference channel achieve the cut-set bound for distributed storage systems. These codes provide data reliability, and perform efficient exact node repair when some node fails. Interference alignment as a concept is especially important to improve the repair efficiency of a failed node in a minimum storage regenerating (MSR) code. In addition it can improve the stored data security in presence of passive intruders. In this paper we construct a new code resilient against a threat model where a passive eavesdropper can access the data stored on a subset of nodes and the downloaded data during the repair process of a subset of failed nodes. We achieve an optimal secrecy capacity for the new explicit construction of MSR interference alignment code. Hence, we show that the eavesdropper obtains zero information from the original message stored across the distributed storage, i.e., a perfect secrecy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed storage systems (DSS) allow distributed storage of data file (message) in all new generation applications and provide more possibilities to improve its reliability and security. The data is stored in a decentralized manner across several unreliable distributed servers (nodes) in the system. The data distribution principle of the current storage systems is a simple scheme of triple replication of each file piece stored on some node. The replication of each piece must be placed in a node different from the node where the original file is stored. This practice is necessary, since one of the most common challenges in DSS, is the so called repair process, which happens when some nodes in the system fail and lose data. In that case, some of the replication data files of the failed original piece are used to recover the lost data. Note that this method is suboptimal in terms of bandwidth. In [1] , Dimakis et al. found a new way of introducing error correcting codes to achieve better efficiency in the storage networks. They called these codes regenerating codes. They are efficient with respect to the storage utilization and the amount downloaded for repair. Different coding techniques could be combined to achieve various goals, such as minimizing the storage in each node, or minimizing the amount of downloaded data needed to repair the failed data. These two goals cannot be achieved at the same time, so one has to make a compromise between these two points called the minimum storage regeneration (MSR) point and the minimum bandwidth regeneration (MBR) point, respectively. The description of the region of achievable rates bounded by MSR and MBR was studied extensively in the previous years (see [2] - [6] ).
Let B be the size of the message that needs to be stored in the system. This message is divided into pieces and stored in all n nodes in the network. The size of each piece of the message stored in a single node is α = B k . Here, k (k < n) is the number of nodes that are going to be contacted by the data collector (user) for reconstructing the original message. Another parameter is β (β < α), the amount of downloaded data from a single node during the repair process. The number of contacted nodes for accomplishing the repair process for recovering the lost data is d (k ≤ d < n).
The parameters in such a regenerating code that aims to reliably store the file of a maximum size B and achieve the cutset bound in DSS, examined in [1] , must satisfy the following condition
Regarding both extreme points obtained from (1), in this paper we focus on the MRS one. The used concept includes the Interference Alignment (IA) method that is widely used for improving the capacity in the wireless communication [7] , and here is adapted to adjust for the DSS and to perform very efficient repair process when some node fail [10] .
Besides the reliability and the availability in storage networks, the security appears to be an additional challenge. A DSS is formed by many nodes widely spread across the Internet. So, each node in such a peer-to-peer network is vulnerable and a potential point of attack. The attackers can eavesdrop the nodes and possibly modify their data. The storage systems distinguish two types of passive attacks or observations. In the first type of attack, the eavesdropper observes the data stored on a subset of nodes in the system, and in the second type of attack the eavesdropper observes all the downloaded data during the repair process of a subset of the new nodes. Some of the researches elaborates the secrecy issue in [11] - [16] .
This work aims at providing an explicit construction of a regenerating code that uses the interference alignment method, which achieves perfect secrecy. In [17] , we have examined the achievement of weak secrecy in MSR code using IA method. Hence, in [18] can be found detail elaboration of this work, with given examples and numerical results.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the use of the IA method in the distributed storage context. In Section III and IV, we give the general approach for providing security of the code construction and the way of the applied secrecy using the IA in DSS. Section V shows the new secure code construction and proves the achieved perfect secrecy and the paper concludes in Section VI.
II. INTERFERENCE ALIGNMENT METHOD IN DSS
The idea of interference alignment (IA) comes from the wireless communications, aimed to design the signals of multiple users in such a way that at every receiver, signals from all the unintended users occupy a subspace of the given space, leaving the remainder of the space free for the signal of the intended user, as explained in [7] . This improves the degree of freedom that represent the rate of growth of network capacity with the log of the signal to noise ratio (SNR).
In the distributed storage context, the IA method is applied during the exact repair process of a failed node in a minimum storage regenerating (MSR) code. The construction by using this method is done by considering a (n, k) systematic code, where the first k nodes are an systematic and, thus, they store k (uncoded) independent symbols. The remaining (n − k) nodes are parity nodes. Linear combinations of the k symbols, where the combinations are defined by the code generation matrix, are stored in these nodes. When there is a failed node, the newcomer (new node) downloads a certain linear combination of the information stored at each of the (n − 1) surviving nodes. The goal is to recover the lost data from the failed node using that set of linear combinations. Assuming that a systematic node has failed, from the (k − 1) surviving nodes the newcomer receives the uncoded independent symbols. The information from the failed node is stored in the (n−k) parity nodes, noting that the information is mixed with the remaining (k − 1) symbols from the (k − 1) systematic nodes. These (k − 1) symbols which are not required by the new node, but arrive in the linear combinations downloaded from the parity nodes, due to the fact they are mixed with the failed symbols, are analogous to the interference in the wireless communication systems. The coding matrices used for making the combinations in the parity nodes, are analogous to the channel matrices in the wireless communications that perform the same function. In the repair process, the downloaded combinations by the newcomer are analogous to the beamforming vectors in wireless communications, elaborated in [8] , [9] . In the context of wireless communications, interference alignment reduces the footprint of the interference at the receiver and enables a greater number of dimensions for the desired signal. In the context of repair, interference alignment reduces the footprint of the interfering symbols at the newcomer, which means a smaller number of units to be downloaded to cancel the interference. However, one important note is that the channel matrices in wireless communications are given by nature and cannot be controlled, while in the storage systems, the coding matrices are a design choice.
In [10] , is explained the construction of an MSR code by using the IA method, where the Cauchy matrix is used as a coding matrix. A detailed explanation is given regarding the repair process, when the failed nodes are only the systematic nodes, only the parity nodes, and a combination of the two, and of the data reconstruction process. In our paper, we are investigating the level of security that can be achieved in the DSSs using the IA way of data distribution.
III. APPROACH FOR PROVING SECRECY
The security is quite important aspect in a distributed storage network. The threat model is such that the eavesdropper may gain access to the data stored in a subset of the storage nodes, and also, to the data downloaded during the repair process of some other subset of nodes. Explicit construction of regenerating codes that achieve information-theoretic secrecy is provided in [11] , [12] . The principle of enabling security is based on the Wiretap channel II described in [19] . The main goal is to construct secure [n, k, d] code to achieve MSR using interference alignment code given in [10] . We denote the number of message symbols that can be securely stored in a distributed system as B (s) . As an input to the MSR interference alignment code, when there is no secrecy, we need to choose a set of message symbols that will be replaced with random symbols R chosen uniformly and independently from the finite field F q over which the code is defined, where
The secure code will be identical with the original code, if we treat the random symbols as message symbols. To prove secrecy in this code construction we first need to consider the worst case scenario, the threat model, where the eavesdropper has access to l 1 (data stored on a subset of nodes), where the set of eavesdropped indices is denoted by E 1 and l 2 (data downloaded during repair of l 2 nodes) nodes, where the set of eavesdropped indices is denoted by E 2 . The total number of compromised nodes in the distributed system can not be greater than k, or (l = l 1 + l 2 ) < k. Moreover, l 1 and l 2 are disjunctive nodes. The proof of the information-theoretic secrecy of this code is established as follows: 1)
Step 1: Show that given the collection of the B (s) secure message symbols U as side information, the eavesdropper can recover all R random symbols i.e., H(R|ε, U = 0). (R denotes a collection of R = B − B (s) random symbols, and ε is a collection of symbols that the eavesdropper gains access to).
2)
Step 2: Show that all but R of the symbols obtained by the eavesdropper are functions of these R symbols, i.e., H(ε) ≤ H(R).
3)
Step 3: Show that the two conditions in steps 1 and 2 necessarily imply that the mutual information between the message symbols U and the symbols obtained by the eavesdropper ε, is zero, i.e., I(U; ε) = 0.
IV. INFORMATION-THEORETIC SECRECY IN INTERFERENCE ALIGNMENT METHOD IN DSS
Pawar et al. in [13] provide an upper bound on B (s) , given by
The interpretation of the bound in (2) is that out of k nodes to which a data collector connects, the first l of these nodes are compromised. Thus, by the assumption that the secrecy goals have been met, these l nodes will not provide any information about the message symbols. Only the remaining (k − l) nodes may provide useful information.
From the MSR point of view the repair bandwidth is strictly greater than the per node storage and an eavesdropper potentially obtains more information when she has an access to the data downloaded during the node repair process. Therefore, for the MSR point of view from (2), the security upper bound becomes,
For the constructed code in this paper, the following result is stated:
Lemma 1. Assume code construction for n = 2k and d = n − 1, in the case of (l 1 , l 2 ) eavesdropper model, where (l = l 1 + l 2 ) < k, the MSR secure bound in (3), when interference alignment is used becomes
Proof: This equality holds for all [n = 2k, k, d = n − 1] MSR codes, where B = kα, dβ = α + (k − 1)β, α = k and β = 1 given in [11] . The total number of symbols that can be stored in MSR distributed system is B = kα. From these symbols we need to subtract all the compromised symbols. From the first type of observation total number of eavesdropped symbols is l 1 α, the observed l 1 nodes will not provide any useful information. Plus from the second type of observation there are (n − l 2 )βl 2 downloaded symbols during the repair process minus these already known from the first type of observation βl 1 l 2 . Thus, the formulation of (4) is following,
Now we need to construct a secure MSR code based on the Interference Alignment concept, using the eavesdropper model (l 1 , l 2 ) that will satisfy the equality (4). As described in [10] , the output codewords will be denoted by C = uG (m) , where u is the message of size B and the secure MSR interference alignment code will be C (s) = u s n G (m) , where u s n is new message consist of u s secure message of size B (s) plus R random symbols. The construction will be made for the case when β = 1, α = d−k +1 = k. The secure MSR interference alignment code need to be constructed from the modified original message u s n , consisting of kα message symbols from which R = B − B (s) symbols will be replaced with random variables, and a generator matrix G (m) , for m = 1, ..., n. G (m) in [10] is defined as,
where m = 1, ..., k are the systematic nodes, and m = k + 1, ..., n are the parity nodes. The parity generator matrices include a Cauchy matrix [20] , a matrix with special construction that efficiently performs the repair and reconstruction process.
V. GENERAL SECURE CODE CONSTRUCTION
In this subsection, we present the general construction of a coding scheme that is secure against an (l 1 , l 2 ) eavesdropper when E 1 ∪ E 2 ⊆ E, for a given set E with cardinality |E| < k, for all parameter values [n = 2k, k, d = n − 1] and d = α + k − 1, β = 1. The code properties indicate that k = α, which has the main role during the process of designing generator matrices for the parity nodes. This relation ensures that each node reserve α = k symbols with linearly independent global kernels used for repair of k systematic nodes. The construction is based on MSR interference alignment code where the message content is modified by B − B (s) random symbols.
The construction will depend based on the following properties associated with the repair process in a MSR interference alignment code: Lemma 2. Assume that an eavesdropper gains access to the data stored on l = l 1 nodes in an MSR interference alignment code. Then, the eavesdropper can only observe lα independent symbols.
Proof: Since the size of the stored data on each node is α = k symbols by the construction of MSR interference alignment code the maximum number of independent symbols that the intruder can reveal is lk if E ⊂ [k].
Lemma 3. Assume that an eavesdropper has an access to the data stored on any l 1 nodes and observes the downloaded data from l 2 nodes that are in reparation process in an MSR interference alignment code. Then the (l 1 , l 2 ) eavesdrooper can observe at most l 1 α + (n − l 2 )βl 2 − βl 1 l 2 independent symbols.
Proof: From Lemma 2 in an (l 1 , l 2 ) eavesdrooper model, (l 1 + l 2 ) < k the intruder can only observe kl 1 independent symbols when it gains access in the data stored on l 1 nodes. Since in MSR interference alignment code the repair bandwidth is βd, where d = n − 1, β = 1, i.e., a newcomer node can recover the lost symbols stored in the failed node by downloading a single symbol from any d nodes, the maximum number of independent symbols that the intruder can reveal is (n − l 2 )βl 2 if E 2 ⊂ N , N (|N | ≤ k) set of indices of systematic nodes, when it gains access the downloaded data of l 2 failed systematic nodes. Therefore, the maximum number of message symbols that the intruder can reveal if it can read-access the data stored in l 1 nodes and read-access the downloaded data during the repair process of l 2 failed systematic nodes is l 1 α + (n − l 2 )β − βl 1 l 2 , where βl 1 l 2 are already observed symbols from the first observation.
Definition 1 (Cauchy Matrix [20] ): An (s × t) Cauchy matrix Ψ over a finite field F q is matrix whose (i, j)-th element (a ≤ i ≤ s, 1 ≤ j ≤ t) equals 1 (xi−yi) where {x i } ∪ {y i } is an injective sequence, i.e., a sequence with no repeated elements.
For the construction of a (s×t) Cauchy matrix the minimum field size will be s + t. Thus by choosing Ψ to be a Cauchy matrix, leads to q ≥ α + n − k.
For the concrete construction any finite field that satisfies this condition will be sufficient, since n − k ≥ α ≥ 2, and q ≥ 4.
For constructing a new secure code based on an MSR interference alignment method we consider the secure message u s of size B (s) over F q , i.e., u s = (a 1 , a 2 , ..., a (k−l1−l2)(α−l2) ). From there we take (l 1 + l 2 )α + (k − l 1 − l 2 )l 2 i.i.d. random symbols r = (r 1 , ..., r (l1+l2)α+(k−l1−l2)l2 ) distributed uniformly at random over F q . The set of random symbols r is appended to the secure message to obtain the general message u s n = (r, u s ) ∈ F q , that will be encoded in the following manner:
The design of the achivability scheme for MSR interference alignment code based on [10] is folowing:
• Design of Systematic Generator Matrices:
In an MSR interference alignment code the first k nodes are systematic and the message symbols that are stored there are in uncoded form. Therefore, the generator matrices for those nodes G
• Design of Parity Generatior Matrices: For designing of the parity matrices it must be chosen matrix Ψ with dimension α × (n − k) with entries drawn from F q such that every submatrix of Ψ has full rank. In this construction, because n − k = α = k, Ψ is a square matrix. The columns of Ψ are defined by
where the m-th column is given by
The matrix Ψ that is used for constructing parity matrices and meets the criteria for the repair process is the so-called Cauchy matrix [10] .
For better clarification a new notation is introduced, i.e., the j-th column of the
The Interference Alignment algorithm is designed such that each of the α parity nodes in a case of the repair process of the -th systematic node will pass its -th column. Regarding the above statement, for the parity nodes k + 1 ≤ m ≤ n, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ α, we select
where is an element from F q so that = 0 and 2 = 1 (needed during the reconstruction process). Note that exists as long as q ≥ 4. This property is required to have a successful repair process in the DSS code construction. The design of this code is made to be in line with the properties and conditions of the wireless interference concept, which is particularly significant in the exact repair of the systematic nodes. Therefore, after the design of the generator matrices the new general secure Interference Alignment code construction is made by multiplication of the secure message u s and the generator matrix G (m) ,
Using the newly constructed secure MSR interference alignment code, we are able to prove the properties that satisfy the reconstruction, repair and security processes. Proof: The sketch of the proof is following, treating the random symbols as message symbols the secure MSR interference alignment code C (s) becomes identical to the MSR interference alignment code C given in [10] . During the reconstruction process, the data collector contacts any k nodes in the system by downloading α symbols from each of them. In total, the amount of information that it gets is kα. In case of all connected nodes to be systematic, which are pure symbols, the obtaining of the original message is straight and easy. In a case of combination of them or all k nodes to be parity, first it need to be cancelled all interfered symbols and after that is possible to be extracted the wanted message. The readers can check this part using [10] .
Theorem 2. (Repair process):
During the repair process, the newcomer can recover the failed data in the newly constructed C (s) code by contacting d, number of contacted nodes for performing the repair process for recovering the lost data, nodes in the system. Proof: Same as for Theorem 1, for Theorem 2 we consider that the random variables can be seen as message symbols, and then the secure MSR interference alignment code C (s) becomes identical to the MSR interference alignment code C elaborated in [10] , where repair processes is possible.The sketch of the proof is that when some node fail, a newcomer comes in the system and contacts any d live nodes by downloading from them only a single symbol (component) of the stored α information. The total downloaded information is d = n − 1 = 2k − 1, where k = α, and we only need to repair the α lost data. For this reason, interference cancellation will be performed leaving only part of the downloaded data. After that the desired component is obtained by multiplying the rest of data with the appropriate inverse Cauchy submatrix. The proof given in [10] is adequate to be applied in the same manner by the new created secure MSR interference alignment code C (s) in this paper. Because of preserving space and similarity of the proof, the readers can check this part using [10] . Theorem 3. (Information-theoretic secrecy): In the code C (s) designed to be secure against a threat model (l 1 , l 2 ), where the eavesdropper has an access to the data stored in l 1 nodes and downloaded data from l 2 nodes, the eavesdropper is not able to obtain any information for the original message, i.e., I(U; ε)=0.
Proof: Let the eavesdropper in the first observation have access to l 1 k stored data in the system, in our case k = α. This means she has an access to B eve s(1) = l 1 k symbols from total B = kα, forming the message u eve s = [r 1 , . . . r k , 0 k+1 , . . . , 0 kα ], in the C (s) code. The eavesdropper, knowing the coding scheme, from the first observation will get the following construction, E (s) 1 = u eve s G (m) . Additionally, another type of observation is accessing the downloaded data equal to B eve s(2) = dβl 2 = dl 2 symbols during the repair process, where β = 1 in our construction. Thus by Theorem 2 in [10] , in the worst case scenario when a failed node is a systematic node, it can be exactly repaired. The same node can be accessed by the eavesdropper and she can download one symbol from each of the remaining nodes. If we consider that the systematic node fails, each of the remaining d = n − 1 nodes will pass its -th column, so that the eavesdropper in the second observation obtains the following columns during the repair process, 
where e denotes the -th unit vector of length α and 0 denotes a zero vector of length α. The element from F q is = 0 and 2 = 1, by Definition 1, which is necessary condition for performing the reconstruction process. Except for the -th component in the matrix, every other component is aligned with the vector e , which will show that some α linear combinations of the columns above will give us a matrix whose -th component equals the (α × α) identity matrix, and has zeros everywhere else. This is a consequence of the interference alignment structure in combination with the linear independence of the α vectors in the desired component,
The eavesdropper after both constructions E can examine which symbols have been revealed. The symbols which are obtained by eavesdropping are gain from two different approaches, meaning that we can conclude that some of the symbols are repeated. The number of repeated symbols h r should be subtracted from the total observed symbols, i.e., these symbols should not be taken into account. Regarding this, the total number of message symbols observed by the eavesdropper is obtained as the sum of the two types of observations explained above, and are given by
According to the Step 1 for proving information-theoretic secrecy, first we need to show that for given message symbols as a side information, the eavesdropper can decode all the random symbols. Therefore, for the first type of observation we generate a new message vector u eve s of length kα consisting of only the symbols seen by the eavesdropper, and all other symbols zeros. This part of the side information is defined as,
where m = 1, 2, ..., k are the systematic nodes and m = k + 1, ..., n are the parity nodes. Our construction is performed for the worst case scenario, or when l = l 1 + l 2 = k − 1, by the assumption that the number of affected nodes is always smaller then the number of systematic nodes l < k. Therefore, for l 1 observed nodes the new message will be u eve
in the construction will have only information for these symbols. We are assuming that the eavesdropper knows the encoding scheme.
For the second type of observation, we take the message u s n and define a new generator matrix G eve for the parity nodes m = k + 1, ..., n, since we assume that the failed node is a systematic node that corresponds to the l 2 nodes in which the eavesdropper can access during the repair downloads. For this case, when node fails the -th column in every matrix except the failed one will have non zero element, and in the other columns zeros. This means that the Cauchy matrices in the generator matrix have nonzero columns only at the places where the eavesdropper has access (parts that will be downloaded during the repair according to which nodes have failed), so that the second part of the side information in our particular construction will bẽ
Thus, the total side information will represent everything that will be achieved during the construction ofẼ So, the part of the R random symbols fromẼ (s) 1 can be reconstructed in an identical way as the data reconstruction in the original MSR interference alignment code [10] , and the part of the R symbols from the failed nodeẼ (s) 2 , can be repaired in the same manner used for the repair process in the original MSR interference alignment code given in [10] . Thus, this represents the first step of the information-theoretic secrecy proof for decoding all random symbols.
The number of chosen random symbols is R = B − B (s) = (l 1 + l 2 )α + (k − l 1 − l 2 )l 2 . The number of observed symbols ε can be calculated as the l 1 α symbols obtained from the first observation plus the (n − l 2 )β symbols passed by each of the remaining l 2 nodes during the repair process in the second observation. In the second observation we need to subtract the already known symbols from the first observation, which are βl 1 symbols for each l 2 observation. Thus, the total number of observed symbols ε is l 1 α + (n − l 2 )βl 2 − βl 1 l 2 . In our construction, for n = 2k and d = n − 1, α = d − k + 1 = k, l 1 + l 2 = l and β = 1, so the expression becomes (l 1 + l 2 )α + (k − l 1 − l 2 )l 2 . We can say that the entropy of the random symbols and the entropy of the eavesdropped symbols are equal H(ε) = H(R). This claim proves the second condition for achieving security in the storage system and that H(ε) ≤ H(R).
Last part of the proof establishes that the eavesdropper obtains no information about the message. In other words, the mutual information between all message symbols U and total observed symbols ε is zero, 
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper considers the security problem of constructing MSR interference alignment code. The MSR interference alignment code in [10] achieves the cut-set bound of repair bandwidth. Besides the optimal exact repair of systematic nodes, this explicit code is capable of performing data reconstruction. The main idea is that the construction is based on the interference alignment concept. This approach is used in the interference channels in wireless communications, where the method of canceling the interference of the other users resembles the repair process in DSS. Besides the reconstruction and repair capabilities of this code, here we show how to construct a new secure code based on the same principle which is resistant to attacks. The threat model is such that the eavesdropper can observe the data stored in any subset of the nodes, and the downloaded data during repair of another subset of failed nodes. The secure code design ensures that it restricts the information available to the eavesdropper and that the eavesdropper is unable to reveal the entire original message.
